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Abstract—There are many factors that influence the day-ahead
market bidding strategies of a GenCo in the current energy
market framework. In this work we study the influence of
both the allowances and emission reduction plan and the in-
corporation of the derivatives medium-term commitments in the
optimal generation bidding strategy to the day-ahead electricity
market. Two different technologies have been considered: the
coal thermal units, high-emission technology, and the combined
cycle gas turbine units, low-emission technology. The operational
characteristics of both kinds of units are modeled in detail. We
deal with this problem in the framework of the Iberian Electricity
Market and the Spanish National Emissions and Allocation
Plans. The economic implications for a GenCo of including the
environmental restrictions of these National Plans are analyzed.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Emission allowances directives
The European Community, abiding with the Kyoto Protocol,
was committed to reduce the aggregate emissions of Green-
house Gasses GHG by 8 %, compared to 1990 levels, in the
period 2008-2012, with different targets set among members
states [1]. The European Union directive for greenhouse gas
emission allowance trading (2003/87/CE) [2] establishes that
each member has to elaborate the National Allocation Plan
(NAP) to determine the total quantity of CO2 emissions that
Member States grant to their companies, which can then be
sold or bought by the companies themselves. The Spanish
NAP for the period 2008-12 was approved on 2007 (RD
1402/2007 [3]). This NAP imposed to the electricity gener-
ation sector a reduction in the CO2 emissions for the period
2008-12 of almost a 60% with respect to the emissions in the
period 2000-05. Emissions trading, as set out in Article 17 of
the Kyoto Protocol, allows countries that have emission units
to spare - emissions permitted but not ”used” - to sell this
excess capacity to countries that are over their targets. The
EU Emission Trading Scheme [4] (EU ETS) is a cornerstone
in the fight against climate change and the first international
trading system for CO2 emissions in the world. The aim of
the EU ETS is to help EU Member States achieve compliance
with their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. Emissions
trading does not imply new environmental targets, but allows
for cheaper compliance with existing targets under the Kyoto
Protocol.
Generation companies are subject to other environmen-
tal limitations besides the aforementioned CO2 emission al-
lowances. The European Union (EU) also sets limits for emis-
sions of pollutants from large combustion plants (Directive
2001/80/EC [5]). This Directive applies to combustion plants
(technical apparatus in which fuels are oxidised in order to
use the heat thus generated) with a rated thermal input equal
to or greater than 50 MW, irrespective of the type of fuel used
(solid, liquid or gaseous). Its purpose is to limit the amount
of sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx) and dust
emitted from large combustion plants each year. Following this
commitment, the Spanish public administration launched in
2004 the Spanish National Emissions Plan (NEP, Real Decreto
430/2004 [6]). This NEP imposes, for the period 2008-15, a
global reduction of a 81% and a 15% for the SO2 and NOx
emissions respectively.
The impact of both National Allocation and Emissions Plans
on the power industry seems very significant and whether these
new restrictions are an opportunity or a threat for the power
industry depends on several factors, specially the strategies
set by power companies to integrate these new restrictions
in their energy’s market bid strategy. Indeed, NAP and NEP
limitations have to be necessarily considered explicitly in the
elaboration of the generation units’ optimal sale bid to the
wholesale electricity market. The study of the impact of NAP
and NEP in the optimal operation of a generation company that
operates in the day-ahead Iberian Electricity Market (IEM) is
the main contribution of this work.
B. Literature review
Several authors have study the impact of the CO2 emissions
trading in the power industry, specially through mid-term
models. In [7] a simulation was carried out for the Iberian
Electricity Market. It was concluded that a rise in electricity
prices is expected when CO2 constraints are in place. Since
this increase in power prices would affect all electricity
producers, a generator that faces less carbon liabilities than
market clearing technology, such as natural gas, would benefit
from the higher power prices, leading to an increase in profits.
In [8] the strategic technology options, especially the potential
role of natural gas combined cycle and nuclear power plants,
in mitigation of CO2 emission in electricity sector in China
are assessed using a least-cost probabilistic simulation and
dynamic programming model. The results obtained in this
study indicate that CO2 emission mitigation through broad
implementation of Combined Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGT) can
be accompanied with reduction of the total discounted cost of
the generation system but is limited by the natural gas supply
capacity. Finally, the work in [9] presents an assessment of the
impact of the Kyoto Protocol on the Iberian Electricity Market.
A market-equilibrium model is used in order to analyze
different conditions faced by generation companies. One of
the conclusions of this paper points again to the CCGT as
the tecnology to replace coal generation in the thermal mix as
the ETS CO2 price increases. This replacement is particularly
important for CO2 prices under e15/tCO2. Contrary to all
these mid-term studies, the work in [10] addresses the short-
term generation scheduling of a set of thermal generation units
through the minimization of the generation plus start-up/shut-
down costs of a MILP deterministic model that includes in the
objective function the emission trading incomes and costs.
C. Contribution
This work presents a new stochastic programming model
to cope with the optimal generation bid to the next day
auctions of the IEM day-ahead market taking into account
CO2 allowances and SO2 and NOx emission constraints. We
consider a price taker GenCo with a set of thermal coal
and CCGT generation units subject to CO2 allowances and
SO2 and NOx emissions constraints. The objective is to find
the generation scheduling and sales bid of each one of the
generators that maximize the expected value of the net profit
of a Genco including the start-up, shut-down and generation
costs together with the incomes from the day-ahead market,
futures and bilateral contracts as well as the incomes/costs
of the CO2 allowances. Several characteristics distinguish this
paper from the previous works. Contrary to other studies, our
model provides the optimal generation bid for each one of
the generation units assuming the representation of optimal
offer curve developed in [11], [12]. Moreover, CCGT units
has been incorporated to the models following the CCGTs’
unit commitment modelization introduced in [13]. Current
electricity markets are organized not only around the short-
term spot energy market but also around a variety of mid-
term physical and financial products, as future and bilateral
contracts, that each generation unit has to integrate in the sale
bid submitted to the market operator following the specific
rules of each national electricity market. Similar to [12], the
model presented here consider the ex-ante negotiated Futures
Contracts (FC) and Bilateral Contracts (FC) of the GenCo,
that are integrated in the optimal bidding strategy accord-
ing to the IEM directives. Finally, our model incorporates
the stochasticity of the electricity market through stochastic
programming [14]. Stochastic programming is a powerful
optimization methodology that allows to incorporate in a
single mathematical optimization model the same statistical
information on the relevant random variables handled in sim-
ulation studies. Doing so, stochastic programming models are
able to provide, in a single run, the best possible here-and-now
decision with respect of the most complete available statistical
information. Finally, the proposed model will be validated with
real data from generation units operating in the IEL and with
real prices from both the Spanish day-ahead and emissions
trading market.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
A. Variables
The random variable λDt , the clearing price of the t
th
hourly auction of the DAM, is represented in the two-stage
stochastic model by a set of scenarios s ∈ S with probability
P s and by the associated clearing price λD,st for auction t
of the day-ahead market, t ∈ T . Both λD,st and P s are
input parameters for the model obtained through scenario
generation and reduction techniques [15], [16]. Following [13]
we consider a set of thermal units I and a set of pseudo-units
P that represents the different generation configurations of
the CC units. These pseudo-units behaves as a set of coupled
thermal units (see section II-G for details of Combined Cycle
units modeling). Therefore, the total set of generation units
considered is U = I ∪ P . In stochastic programming models,
those decision variables that doesn’t depend on the scenarios
s are called first stage variables which, in our model are, for
every time period t ∈ T and generation unit i ∈ U :
• The unit commitment variables, uti, cuti, c
d
ti.
• The price acceptant offer bid, qti.
• The scheduled energy for futures contract j ∈ F , ftij .
• The scheduled energy for bilateral contract, bti.
All the first stage decision variables are continuous except
the unit commitment variables u which are binary. Decision
variables that can adopt different values depending on the
scenario are called second stage variables. In our formulation
these variables, all continuous, are, for each t ∈ T , generation
unit i ∈ U and scenario s ∈ S:
• The total generation, gsti.
• The matched energy in the day-ahead market, psti.
B. Futures and Bilateral Contracts Covering Constraints
The coverage of both the physical futures and bilateral
contracts obligations must be guaranteed. If LFj is the amount
of energy (MWh) to be procured at each hour t by the set
of available generation units then the following constraint
applies:∑
i∈Ij
ftij = L
F
j ∀j ∈ F , ∀t ∈ T (a)
ftij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ U , ∀j ∈ F , ∀t ∈ T (b)
 (1)
where Ij ⊂ U stands for the set of thermal and pseudo-units
allowed to cover the FC j. Analogously, if LBtk is the amount
of energy (MWh) to be procured during hour t of the delivery
period to cover BC j, then the following bilateral contract
constraints must be considered:∑
i∈U
bti =
∑
k∈B
LBtk ∀t ∈ T (a)
0 ≤ bti ≤ Piuti ∀i ∈ U , ∀t ∈ T (b)
 (2)
C. Day-ahead market bid constraints
The IEM establishes the following rules to integrate energies
LFj and L
B
k in the day-ahead market bid of a generation unit:
1) If generator i ∈ U contributes with ftij MWh at period
t to the coverage of the FC j, then the energy ftij must
be offered to the pool for free (price acceptance sale
bid).
2) If generator i ∈ U contributes with bti MWh at period
t to the coverage of any of the BCs, then this energy
is excluded from the sale bid but the remaining unit’s
production capacity P i − bti must be bid to the DAM.
These market rules can be included in the model by means of
the following set of constraints:
psti ≤ Piuti − bti ∀i ∈ U , ∀t ∈ T , ∀s ∈ S (3)
psti ≥ qti ∀i ∈ U , ∀t ∈ T , ∀s ∈ S (4)
qti ≥ Piuti − bti ∀i ∈ U , ∀t ∈ T (5)
qti ≥
∑
j|i∈Ij
ftij ∀i ∈ U , ∀t ∈ T (6)
where:
• (3) and (4) ensures that if a unit is on, the matched energy
psti will be between the instrumental price bid qti and the
total available energy not allocated to a BC. Pi, Pi are
the upper and lower bounds on the energy generation
(MWh).
• (5) and (6) guarantee respectively that the minimum
generation output of the committed units will be matched,
and that the contribution of the unit to the FC coverage
will be included in the instrumental price bid.
The analytical expression of the optimal generation bid of the
generations units can derived from this market constraints [12].
D. Total Generation Constraints
The total generation level of a given unit i, gsti, is defined
as the addition of the allocated energy to the BC, plus the
matched energy in the DAM:
gsti = bti + p
s
ti ∀i ∈ U , ∀t ∈ T , ∀s ∈ S (7)
The generation output of a any generation unit gsti is a semi-
continuous variable restricted to gsti ∈ {0} ∪ [P i, P i], that is:
P iuti ≤ gsti ≤ P iuti ∀i ∈ U , ∀t ∈ T , ∀s ∈ S (8)
E. SO2 and NOx Emission Constraints
The Spanish National Emission Plan imposes limits SO2
and NOx to the joint emission of the thermal units (CC units
are excluded). These limitations are included in the model by
imposing an emission limit at every scenario s through the
following set of constraints:
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
eSO2i g
s
ti ≤ SO2 s ∈ S (9)∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
eNOxi g
s
ti ≤ NOx s ∈ S (10)
TABLE I
STATES OF THE CC UNIT AND ITS ASSOCIATED PSEUDO UNITS
CC unit with a CT and HRSG/ST
State Composition Pseudounit 1 uPc(1)t Pseudounit 2 uPc(2)t
0 0CT+0HRSG/ST off 0 off 0
1 1CT+0HRSG/ST on 1 off 0
2 1CT+1HRSG/ST off 0 on 1
the emission coefficients eSO2i and e
NOx
i depend on the
generation technology.
F. Thermal Unit Commitment Constraints
Following [12], let uti be the first-stage binary variable
expressing the off-on operating status of the ith unit and let
cuti, c
d
ti be continuous variables representing the startup and
shutdown cost, respectively, of unit i in interval t. Let also con-
stant Gi be the number of periods that unit i must be initially
online, due to its minimum up-time toni . Analogously let Hi
be the number of periods that unit i must be initially offline,
due to its minimum down-time toffi . Finally let parameter u0i
stands for the initial state of each thermal unit: u0i = 1 if the
unit is on and u0i = 0 if the unit is off. The following set
of constraints conveniently models the start-up and shut-down
costs and the minimum operation and idle time for each unit,
improving the formulation in [12]:
cuti ≥ coni [uti − u(t−1),i] ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈ I (11)
cdti ≥ coffi [u(t−1),i − uti] ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈ I (12)
Gi∑
j=n
(1− uji) = 0 ∀i ∈ I (13)
Hi∑
j=1
uji = 0 ∀i ∈ I (14)
min{t+toni −1,|T |}∑
n=t
uni ≥ αonti [uti − u(t−1)i]
t = Gi + 1, . . . , |T |, ∀i ∈ I (15)
min{t+toffi −1,|T |}∑
n=t
(1− uni) ≥ αoffti [u(t−1)i − uti]
t = Hi + 1, . . . , |T |, ∀i ∈ I (16)
where the parameters αonti and α
off
ti are defined as:
αonti =min{toni , |T | − t+ 1} (17)
αoffti =min{toffi , |T | − t+ 1} (18)
G. Combined Cycle Unit Commitment Constraints
The CC units represent a combination of combustion and
steam turbines within a power plant. Typically, a CC unit con-
sists of several combustion turbines (CTs) and a set of an heat
recovery steam generator (HRSG) and a steam turbine (ST).
Based on the different combinations of CTs and HRSG/ST, a
CC unit can operate at multiple states or configurations. The
first two columns of Table I show the states of a CC unit with a
CT and an HRSG/ST considered in this study.The operational
rules of a typical CC unit were formulated in [13] with the
help of the so-called pseudo units (PUs). As the thermal units,
the PUs of each CC unit have their own cost characteristics,
real power generation limits, minimum on time limits, etc., and
can be viewed as a special set of coupled single thermal units.
Our formulation only considers two PUs, each one associated
with states 1 and 2 of the CC respectively, with the subsequent
saving in the number of variables and constraints with respect
to earlier proposed models for CC [17]. The on/off state of
these two PUs uniquely determines the state of the CC (see
columns 3 and 5 of Table I), and allows a correct modeling of
the operation of the state 0 without the need of any additional
PU.
Let us define Pc, the set of PUs of the CC unit c ∈ C, and
P = ∪c∈CPc, the complete set of PUs. By Pc(j), we denote
the PU associated with the state j ∈ {1, 2} of the CC unit
c. Thus, U = I ∪P represents the complete set of generation
units (thermal and pseudo). The on/off state of each thermal
and pseudo units at period t can be represented by the first-
stage binary variables uti, i ∈ U . Columns 4 and 6 of Table I
illustrate the relation of the commitment binary variables of the
PUs, utPc(1) and utPc(2), with the state of the associated CC
unit. Each PU i ∈ P also has its own start-up cost, without
shut-down costs, and no cost is associated to the transition
from state 2 to state 1.
cutPc(1) ≥ conPc(1)
[
[utPc(1) − u(t−1)Pc(1)]
− [u(t−1)Pc(2) − utPc(2)]
]
t ∈ T , c ∈ C
(19)
cutPc(2) ≥ conPc(2)[utPc(2) − u(t−1)Pc(2)] t ∈ T , c ∈ C
(20)
Each PU i ∈ P has its own minimum up time, toni :
min{t+toni −1,|T |}∑
n=t
uni ≥ αonti [uti − u(t−1)i]
t = Gi + 1, . . . , |T |, i ∈ P
(21)
where again u0i represents the initial state of each pseudo unit
i ∈ P , αonti is defined as in (17) and Gi is the number of the
initial time periods along which the pseudo unit must remain
on. So as in Eq. (13):
Gi∑
t=1
(1− uti) = 0 i ∈ P , t ∈ T (22)
Each CC unit also has a minimum down time, i.e., once shut
down, the CC unit cannot be started up before (toffc )
C periods.
As in the case of the thermal and pseudo units, the following
constraints formulate the minimum down time condition for
t t+ 1
State 0State 0
State 1State 1
State 2State 2
(0CT+0HRSG/ST)(0CT+0HRSG/ST)
(1CT+0HRSG/ST)(1CT+0HRSG/ST)
(1CT+1HRSG/ST)(1CT+1HRSG/ST)
Fig. 1. Feasible transitions of the CC unit with a CT and HRSG/ST
the CC units:
min{t+(toffc )C−1,|T |}∑
n=t
[1− (unPc(1) + unPc(2))] ≥
αofftc
[
(u(t−1)Pc(1) + u(t−1)Pc(2))
−(utPc(1) + utPc(2))
]
t = HCc + 1, . . . , |T |, c ∈ C
(23)
where
αofftc = min{(toffc )C , |T | − t+ 1}
and HCc represents the number of the initial time periods along
which the CC unit must remain off. So as in Eq. (14):
HCc∑
t=1
utPc(1) + utPc(2) = 0 c ∈ C , t ∈ T (24)
The satisfaction of the feasible transitions rules (Fig. 1)
impose additional constraints to the operation of the PUs
associated to the same CC unit, c ∈ C. First, the PUs in Pc
are mutually exclusive Eq. (25)(a), i.e., only one of them can
be committed at a given period (a CC can only be in one
state simultaneously). Second, the change of the commitment
of the PUs in Pc between periods t − 1 and t are limited
to the feasible transitions depicted in Fig. 1. These feasible
transitions impose that, if the CC unit c is in state 0 at
period t− 1 (u(t−1)Pc(1)) + u(t−1)Pc(2) = 0), it cannot be in
state 2 at period t (utPc(2) = 0) (Eq. (25)(b)). Conversely, if
u(t−1)Pc(2) = 1, then utPc(1)+utPc(2) ≥ 1 (Eq. (25)(c)). The
following set of constraints formulates the specific operation
rules of the CC units:
∑
m∈Pc
utm ≤ 1 (a)
utPc(2) ≤ u(t−1)Pc(1)) + u(t−1)Pc(2) (b)
u(t−1)Pc(2) ≤ utPc(1) + utPc(2) (c)

c ∈ C,
t ∈ T
(25)
H. Objective Function
The expected value of the profit function of the GenCo
with respect to the spot market price random variable λD can
expressed as :
EλD [Profit] = h(u, c
u, cd, g, p, b, f)
|T |
[∑
k∈F
λFk L
F
k
]
+
∑
t∈T
∑
j∈B
λBCtj L
BC
tj (26)
−
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
[
cuti + c
d
ti + c
b
iuti
]
(27)
−
∑
t∈T
∑
c∈C
[
cutPc(1) + c
u
tPc(2) +
∑
i∈Pc
cbiuti
]
(28)
+
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈U
∑
s∈S
P s
[
λD,st p
s
ti−(cligsti+cqi (gsti)2)
]
(29)
− λCO2
[∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
P s[∑
i∈U
eCO2i (c
b
iuti + c
l
ig
s
ti+c
q
i (g
s
ti)
2)
]
− CO2
]
(30)
where:
(26) corresponds to the incomes of the FCs and the BCs and
is a constant term. λFk and λ
BC
tj are the prices of FCs and
BCs respectively.
(27) accounts for the on/off fixed cost of the unit commitment
of the thermal units. It is independent of the realization of
the random variable λD. cbi are the constant coefficients
of the generation costs (e).
(28) CC’s start-up and fixed generation costs. This term does
not depend on the realization of the random variable λD.
(29) represents the expected value of the benefits from the day-
ahead market, where P s is the probability of scenario s.
The term between brackets corresponds to the expression
of the quadratic generation costs with respect to the total
generation of the unit, gsti.
(30) this term accounts for the cost/incomes associated to the
purchase/sale of the CO2 emissions rights [9], where
CO2 corresponds to the GenCo’s aggregated free emis-
sion allowances (tCO2) and λCO2 is the estimated CO2-
emission price (e/tCO2) in the emission trading market
[4]. The model for the CO2 emission follows the assump-
tion in [10] and [18] that the nonlinear emission function
is proportional to the quadratic generation cost function
of each unit.
TABLE II
CHARACTERISTICS OF FUTURES AND BILATERAL CONTRACTS
j LBCj,t=1...24 λ
BC
j,t=1...24 L
FC
j,t=1...24 λ
FC
j,t=1...24
MW e/MWh MW e/MWh
1 164 43,35 120 45,6
2 50 43,35 120 46,1
3 150 43,35 120 51,2
TABLE III
DAILY EMISSION ALLOWANCES AND LIMITS DATA
λCO2 CO2 SO2 NOx
15.28 e/t 1.527 t 3.900 kg 17.651 kg
I. Final model
The model defined so far can be represented as:
max h(u, cu, cd, g, p, b, f)
s.t. :
Eq. (1)− (2) FC and BC
Eq. (3)− (6) Day-ahead market
Eq. (7)− (8) Total generation
Eq. (9)− (10) Emission
Eq. (11)− (16) Thermal unit commitment
Eq. (19)− (25) CC unit commitment
(31)
Problem (31) is a mixed, continuous-binary concave quadratic
maximization problem with linear constraints. This optimiza-
tion problem can be solved with the help of standard opti-
mization software.
III. CASE STUDY
A. Generators, Market and Emission Data
The data for the day-ahead market prices has been down-
loaded from the website of the Independent Iberian Market
Operator OMEL [19]. This study uses the same set of 50
scenarios generated in [20] for the random day-ahead market
spot prices λD as the result of the application of a scenario
reduction algorithm [21] to the complete set of historic data
available from June 2007 to May 2010 [20]. The generation
units of this study corresponds to the same four thermal units
and two combined cycle units considered in [13] from which
the technical characteristics (generation cost function, limits
to the generation, etc) can be obtained. They correspond to
actual generation units currently operating in the IEM. Table
II shows the number, energy and price of the bilateral and
futures contracts.
All the data related with CO2, SO2 and NOx can be obtained
from tables III and IV. The emissions trading price for the
CO2 rights corresponds to the mean of the spot European Unit
Allowances prices for May 2010, which can be downloaded
from [22]. The total free emission allowances CO2 corre-
sponds to the 60% reduction imposed by the Spanish National
Allowances Assignment Plan [3] and the emission limits SO2
NOx derives from the National Emission Reduction Plan [6].
TABLE IV
GENERATION UNIT’S EMISSIONS DATA
eCO2i e
SO2
i e
NOx
i
t/e kg/MWh kg/MWh
Thermal units (Coal) 0.07228 0.7848 1.368
CC units (Gas) 0.0104 - -
The generation unit’s emission data shown in table IV are
adapted from [18] while the SO2 and NOx emissions rates
correspond to the values published by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change Emission [23] for coal thermal units.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Three case studies was used to evaluate the impact of
the CO2 allowances and emission constraints in the optimal
scheduling and bid of the generation units:
• BASE: optimal bid problem without neither emission
constraints nor CO2 allowances. Corresponds to problem
(31) excluding both the CO2 rights incomes/cost term
(30) and emission constraints (9)-(10).
• EC: optimal bid problem with only emission constraints.
Corresponds to problem (31) excluding the CO2 rights
incomes/cost term (30) but retaining emission constraints
(9)-(10).
• CO2EC: The complete model (31) with both CO2 al-
lowances and emission constraints.
All the cases have been implemented with the AMPL mod-
eling language [24] and solved with CPLEX 12.0 [25]
(mipgap=0.05, threads=20) over a SunFire X2200 with
32 Gb of RAM memory and two dual core processors AMD
Opteron 2222 at 3 GHz, taking advantage of the multithreading
capabilities of CPLEX. The number of continuous and binary
variables is 20.448 and 200 respectively and the number of
linear constraints is 49.458 for the BASE case and 49.558 for
the other two cases. The execution time is below one minute
in all the cases.
Table V depicts the expected value of the CO2, SO2 and
NOx emissions, at the optimal solution of the three cases.
Focusing on the CO2EC case, the CO2, SO2 and NOx emis-
sions has been reduced by 70%, 74% and 75% respectively.
Finally, table VI shows the optimal value of the expected
profits (objective function of problem (31) for the three cases
together with the disclosure of the value of the different terms
(26)-(30). Although the reduction in the total generation forced
by the SO2 and NOx limits (case EC) causes a decrease of
14% in the total profit, the expected incomes due to the CO2
rights (266.114e) compensates this loss increasing the total
expected profits in a 32%.
Finally, the impact of the CO2 allowances and emission
constraints over the individual units commitment of each
generation unit, together with the optimal dispatch of the
bilateral and future contracts can be judged from Fig. 2 and
3. Fig. 2 depicts the optimal unit commitment for the BASE
case. The blue area corresponds to the energy allocated to the
TABLE V
DAILY EMISSIONS AT OPTIMAL SOLUTION
E[CO2] E[SO2] E[NOx]
BASE 2.761 t 15.381 kg 26.811 kg
EC 835 t 3.900 kg 6.798 kg
CO2EC 801 t 3.898 kg 6.796 kg
TABLE VI
OPTIMAL INCOMES AND COSTS
BASE EC CO2EC
E[Profit] 554.479e 472.677e 734.052e
BC Incomes 419.122e 419.122e 419.122e
FC Incomes 374.543e 374.543e 374.543e
E[market incomes] 1.101.440e 482.469e 398.955e
E[Generation Costs] -1.334.540e -799.772e -720.998e
Start-up/shut-down Costs -6.088e -3.683e -3.683e
E[CO2 rights cost/incomes] - - 266.114e
bilateral contracts (variable bti); the green area is the energy of
the price acceptance bid qti that includes the energy allocated
to the futures contracts ftij . Finally, the yellow area is, for each
generation i and period t, the expected value of the matched
energy in the day-ahead market
∑
s∈S P
spsti. Comparing
the generation profiles in both figures it is clear how the
environmental constraints are affecting the unit commitment:
all the high-emission coal thermal generators are shut-down as
soon as toffi allows, except thermal unit 3, which is maintained
on to satisfy future contract 3. This effect is due mainly to
the opportunity of profits in the CO2 market by reducing
the emission below the GenCo’s free emission allowances.
Although the energy matched in the day-ahead market (the
addition of the green plus yellow areas) is reduced from the
BASE to the CO2EC cases, the overall profits increases due
to the CO2 rights incomes.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A new stochastic programming model has been described,
implemented and tested that allow generation companies with
bilateral and futures contracts obligations to find the optimal
unit commitment and bidding to wholesale electricity markets
compliant with National Allocations and Emissions Plans. The
numerical test provides a reduction of the overall CO2, SO2
and NOx emissions by 70% together with 30% increase in
the expected total profit, availing of the CO2 emissions rights
market. Although more evidence is needed, the results suggest
that, with the day-ahead market and CO2 allowances prices
used in this study, the CO2 rights market can be a valid tool
for utilities to reduce their emissions without any loss in their
overall profits.
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Fig. 2. Unit commitment of the generation units for the BASE case: bti
(blue), qti (green). In yellow the expected value of matched energy. For the
CC units, dark colors are for state 1 and light colors for state 2.
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Fig. 3. Unit commitment of the generation units for the CO2EC case: bti
(blue), qti (green). In yellow the expected value of matched energy. For the
CC units, dark colors are for state 1 and light colors for state 2.
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